Introduction
The Orthodox Church of Greece under the leadership of Christodoulos fit many of the stereotypes facing Greek Orthodoxy, and the Orthodox world in general:
namely, a politicised, nationalist-tending church, and one which actively protects privileges it enjoys vis-à-vis the state (enjoyed at the expense of minority faiths) 1 . These stereotypes tend to carry assumptions about the nature of the Orthodox faith and, specifically, about 'organic' links between religion and national identity, and between church and state in Orthodox contexts.
However, such perspectives fail to account for contingencies, variations and differentiations throughout ecclesiastical history in the Orthodox world and, indeed, in modern Greece. They also fail to account for changes ushered in by Archbishop Ieronymos, elected for the role in February 2008. The relevant literature lacks a systematic study of the range of factors at play across various Orthodox contexts, including agency (political and religious), historical context, and the legal framework of church-state relations -a large project critically needed within individual Orthodox country cases, and across cases.
The present study is limited to the case of Greece but will bear resonance for other Orthodox contexts also. In the pages that follow, I will offer as a backdrop to our examination certain representations of the Orthodox world which echo prevalent stereotypes. I will then narrow the focus to the Greek case, challenging conceptions of organic links between religion and national identity, and between church and state, by exploring three interrelated dimensions in particular: historical contingency in the development of the relationship between religion and national identity; the specificities of churchstate relations in the Greek case; and the factor of agency, touching on the transition in the Archbishopric from Christodoulos to Ieronymos.
Finally, I will bring these strands together in a discussion on the place of religion in the Greek public sphere, including debates on church-state relations particularly in the aftermath of Ieronymos' election. Here I will, necessarily, rely heavily on newspaper coverage during a limited time period.
The timing for such an exercise is ripe, not only because of the change in church leadership, but also because of the debates about the place of religion in the European public sphere currently taking place. The idea is to move the discussion on the Greek case further: rather than stagnating in accounts of Orthodox or Greek exceptionalism which highlight differences from other
Christian contexts, to examine instead common contributions to a broader discussion on religion in the public sphere. This paper thus aims to steer clear Meanwhile, academic literature on Orthodoxy too is often characterised by an explicit focus on such trends. For example, in an edited volume on Religion in an Expanding Europe, one scholar writes:
Orthodoxy, thus, is a religion which -to quote Shakespeare -'looks on tempests and is never shaken' -not even when it should be.
Whatever changes may impact the world, the Orthodox Church refuses, for the most part, to accommodate itself to change, standing fixed in time, its bishops' gaze riveted on an 'idyllic past' which serves as their beacon (Ramet 2006: 148) .
The article makes the broader argument that Orthodoxy generally carries a mistrust of liberalism, cosmopolitanism, universalism, and democracy.
Elsewhere in the same volume, it is suggested that the ties between religion and nation are 'much more pronounced and organic in the Orthodox tradition' (Byrnes 2006: 293) . That these ties are relatively pronounced in Orthodox contexts is an anticipated assessment and one applicable to many, though not all, Orthodox settings. To say they are 'organic', though, requires careful analysis.
Indeed, the term 'organic' factors prominently in certain texts on Orthodoxy.
What such authors mean by 'organic' is worth considering. The Oxford English Dictionary offers two definitions which fit the predominant uses of the term: a.
(of parts of a whole) fitting together in a harmonious way; and b 
Historical contingencies in the religion-national identity link
The historical links between religion and national identity in Greece are broad and deep, and well-researched 3 . It will suffice to highlight, simply for indicative purposes, certain climactic points in the evolution of this relationship in modern Greece. The first is the experience of the Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Empire and, specifically, the role that the experience of the Ottoman millet system played in consolidating religious and national identity. Under the millet system, non-Muslim communities were divided into religious groups and given 'protected' status: in exchange for the payment of a special tax, they were allowed to live within the Muslim state without converting to Islam, but as second-class subjects. The millets enjoyed a measure of autonomy and were represented by their religious leaders in their dealings with the Sublime Porte.
Although the Orthodox millet was ecumenical and multinational in nature, in reality it was largely Greek-dominated: the succession of Patriarchs was Greek, and the social administration was almost exclusively in the hands of Meanwhile, the declaration of autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate entailed also legalisation of the church's subordination to the state. The administrative leader of the highest ecclesiastical power, a five-member Synod, was to be the King (though Roman Catholic). The latter was in accordance with the Bavarian prototype whereby the King was also the 'supreme bishop' (Kokosalakis 1987: 235) ; it was not, to be certain, a Byzantine or Orthodox legacy.
A further climactic period in the developing links between Orthodoxy and
Greek national identity is to be found in the flourishing of the Megali Idea One underlying theme in these historical references spanning centuries is political expediency, in very particular circumstances -circumstances which, without too much imagination necessary, one could see how they could have been different, and with different outcomes in terms of the relationship between religion and national identity. Still, the religion-national identity link has shown remarkable resilience -many banal examples of this are to be found below.
Legal framework of church-state relations
The legal-framework for contemporary church-state relations in Greece is set out in the 1975 Constitution that came into effect after the return to democracy.
As we shall see, this legal framework leaves considerable room for entanglements between the church and the state; for privileges of the Orthodox Holy Water each of the parliamentarians. And of especially symbolic impact is 6 Paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of Article 13. According to Paragraph 2, 'known' religions are protected by this provision. To be 'known' the religion must not have a secret dogma or a hidden cult; it must apply to the Greek state for recognition; and the cult should not offend public order and moral principles. The latter includes the whole set of civil, moral, social and economic principles and beliefs prevailing in Greek society at a given period. The above conditions are enforced by the public administration and, ultimately, by the courts. See Papastathis (1996: 84) . 7 Certain tax exemptions apply to other faiths as well, while the state receives 35% of all parish revenues (Papastathis 1996: 86 Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status over other faiths, but I will limit our focus here to two: the building and operation of places of worship for nonOrthodox peoples in Greece; and the application of legal provisions against proselytism.
In the first case, Greek Orthodox metropolitans (bishops presiding over the 'metropolises' into which the church administration is divided) are given a role In fact, though, the approval of the local bishop is, in legal terms, an 'opinion' which the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs is required to hear, but not to obey, in deciding on issuance of the permits. However, if a Ministry chooses to permit the establishment against the metropolitan's recommendation, it would have to justify its decision. In practice, the metropolitans are almost always against such developments and the Ministry does not as a rule oppose them (Papastathis 1996: 85) . Thus, in reality, the dominant tendency today still gives priority to the safeguarding of the prevailing religion over true religious freedom (Dimitropoulos 2001: 144) .
Notably, the discriminatory enforcement of this legislation by Greek authorities has been the subject matter of a path-breaking case leading to unreserved condemnation of Greece by the European Court of Human Rights for practices against religious minorities (Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 1996) . These feared costs also go a long way towards explaining the status quo in general regarding church privileges within the constitutional framework.
Meanwhile, on the part of the church, we have church leaders rely on and promote a religion-national identity link in efforts to maintain those privileges (including of course the financial benefits entailed). But of course, church attitudes and actions vary significantly according to the church hierarchy makeup, as we shall see below.
Agency -1998-2008
As far as church leaders go, Christodoulos' perspective on church-state relations was amongst his distinguishing markers. The Archbishop set the tone in his first month in the archbishopric -which, it should be noted, coincided with parliamentary discussions on the forthcoming constitutional revisions (including the question of a possible revision in church-state relations): he denounced 'those who want the shrinking of the church, because they know that the nation owes its existence to the church' (Alivizatos 1999) . Indeed, a perennial theme throughout his period of influence was the necessary role played by the church, and by Greek Orthodoxy, in preserving the Greek nation.
In fact, Christodoulos' voice on this theme in some cases was devoid of any mention of the church or of the Orthodox faith altogether; rather, he spoke as if on behalf of the Greek people as a whole. For example:
I worry about our national issues because I see that plans are being promoted which come into conflict with our rightly-understood national interests. We Greeks won our independence with sacrifice and blood and freed the parts of the so-called 'unredeemed'
Hellenism. We cannot lose them today… (Christodoulos 2006) This stance, together with his actions in the realm of politics (e.g., on the identity card issue), won Christodoulos a great deal of criticism. The critique is perhaps most acute in the aftermath of his death and in the transition to new church leadership. For brevity's sake, I will focus on the critique in the latter period, as expressed in the print media. 'Christ is our leader and Christ said whoever wants to be first must be the servant of all', was described as 'not person-centric', suggesting the contrast with that under Christodoulos (Kalimeri 2008) . One journalist draws the contrast more explicitly, reminding readers that Christodoulos' inaugural address was focused, instead, on exploring his role as Primate, the 'First' in the Greek Orthodox Church (Antoniadou 2008b) .
Change introduced by Ieronymos is another recurrent theme in the newspaper coverage, where the term 'new page' factors prominently: 'the new page in the book of the Church of Greece seems that it will differ a lot from the previous one' (Antoniadou 2008b) ; 'the church, for 10 years, lived the dynamic but also exuberance of Christodoulos. Now, the hierarchy judged that the church had to move from the "I" to the "we" and to return to its synodal course, with a prudent, low-key (meaningfully so) archbishop at its head' (Kalokairinos 2008) . His shunning of television cameras was especially striking to certain 'Political and ecclesiastical rulers tend to toy with it like candy in order to avoid the substance of the matter' -i.e., the specific definition of these terms and roles (Konidaris 2008a) . Both sides draw the boundaries in different places, and so instead a superficial discussion continues, entailing a reiteration of the need to establish 'distinctive roles', but with no real efforts to delimit these. Clearly, this is a poignant question, and it brings us to another dimension in the Greek debates on the place of religion in the public sphere -that questioning our conceptions of 'public' and 'private', which of course has implications for the place of religion in relation to the state or nation. Pantelis Kalaitzidis (2007) guides us adeptly through these debates. Making reference to a number of France -both cases where, in fact, the entanglements of religion with policy are rather intricate. On this see Berger, Davie and Fokas 2008) . At the same time, certainly formally eradicating the constitutional privileges enjoyed by the Greek Orthodox Church is a healthy starting point, one which could have a trickle-down effect into society in general.
But such measures would have to be accompanied by other efforts which will effectuate a long-term, but steady and coherent process of change -efforts focused on the aforementioned operative and combatable factors which (directly or indirectly) lead to limitations on religious freedoms and equality.
For example, alteration of the way history is taught in schools and the place of religion and the church in this, thus helping lead to a better educated public less accepting of exploitations of church-state links; support for politicians risking political losses by resisting inappropriate interferences from the church, if and as they arise and, by the same token, some system of reprimand for those politicians who instead manipulate church-state links to their political benefit (something which will be much more conceivable if building upon the former suggestion re education of the public); and support for 'progressive' clergy who resist the banal and clichéd links between religion and nation, church and state and, rather, seek to cultivate the church's spiritual mission.
Conclusion
The current debates on the place of religion in the Greek public sphere come at an interesting moment in the trajectory of religion in the European public sphere, marked by lively discussion about the notion of a European 'secular neutrality'. On the one hand, we have popular literature voicing a hardline prosecularism (of which Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion is a most conspicuous piece), and on the other, an increasingly vocal, and proliferating, group of scholars criticising the secularist assumptions prevalent in the European context and in some cases, calling for a 'post-secular Europe', where religion has a legitimate place in the European public sphere (e.g., Jurgen
Habermas ( This much should suffice at least as a starting point to re-focus our attention on actual factors at play behind the events and developments that lead to the stereotypes. On such a firmer basis, we are better prepared for an assessment of how to address problem areas (e.g. contesting the social, de facto influences, beyond the de jure realities). We are also thus better prepared for a constructive discussion on religion in the European public sphere, inclusive of Orthodox contexts.
